Vecon Lab Bargaining and Conflict: Introduction

Overview: This program runs a two-person, bargaining game. In the Dictator version, one person simply decides unilaterally how to split a fixed amount of money. In the Ultimatum treatment, the proposer makes an offer of how to split the money, which the responder either accepts or rejects. An acceptance implements the proposed split, and a rejection results in zero earnings for both. There is also a Two-Stage Alternating-Offer treatment, in which the responder can either accept the initial proposal or reject and make a counter offer which can then be accepted (and implemented) or rejected by the initial proposer. Bargaining games provide facsinating perspectives on the the interplay between fairness and strategy.
There are two alternative setup options with randomly determined disagreement outcomes: a Political Conflict Game and a Legal Disupte Game. In each case, the agressor (plaintiff) makes an initial demand, and the responder (defendant) may counter. A rejected settlement offer leads to a conflict with randomly determined outcomes.


Vecon Lab - July 22, 2014