Bidders in these multi-unit auctions acquire one or more items,
e.g. leases, licenses, or commodities.
Bidders are given random signals that can be either 1) known private values,
2) unbiased estimates of a common value or 3) separate components of an unknown common value, as in a "wallet game".
Bidding can take place in "rounds," with a cutoff that
increases (clock auctions) or decreases (Dutch auctions). Single-round
sealed-bid procedures and continuous-time bidding formats are also available with either
"pay as bid" (discriminatory) or uniform (market-clearing) prices.
Other setup options include reserve prices, maximum bids, various information settings, and a chat room for collusive disucssions.
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The program calculates and graphs a sequence of revenue and efficiency performance measures, as shown on the left. For a description of design options for multi-unit auctions, see Holt (2006) Markets, Games, and Strategic Behavior, Addision-Wesley, Chapter 22.
Vecon Lab - June 3, 2020