Bidders in these multi-unit auctions acquire one or more items, e.g. leases, licenses, or commodities. Bidders are given random signals that can be either 1) known private values, 2) unbiased estimates of a common value or 3) separate components of an unknown common value. Bidding in each auction can take place in "rounds," with a cutoff that increases (clock auctions) or decreases (Dutch auctions). Single-round sealed-bid procedures and continuous-time bidding formats are also available with either "pay as bid" (discriminatory) or uniform (market-clearing) prices. Other setup options include reserve prices, maximum bids, various information settings, and a chat room for collusive disucssions.

The program calculates and graphs a sequence of revenue and efficiency performance measures, as shown on the left. For a description of design options for multi-unit auctions, see Holt (2019) Markets, Games, and Strategic Behavior: An Introduction to Experimental Economics, Princeton University Press, Chapter 28.