Bidders in these multi-unit procurement auctions sell one or more items,
e.g. units or tons.
Bidders are given random signals that can be either 1) known private costs,
2) unbiased estimates of a common cost 3) separate components of an unknown common cost.
Bidding in each auction can take place in "rounds," with a cutoff that
decreases (clock auctions). Single-round
sealed-bid procedures are also available with either
"receive as bid" (discriminatory) or uniform (market-clearing) prices.
Other setup options include reserve prices, maximum bids, various information settings, and a chat room for collusive disucssions.
| | | | | | The program calculates and graphs a sequence of expenditure and efficiency performance measures. For a description of design options for multi-unit auctions, see Holt (2019) Markets, Games, and Strategic Behavior: An Introduction to Experimental Economics, Princeton University Press, Chapter 28. |
Vecon Lab - November 22, 2024 |